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Tunisia’s recent growth and development performance relative to countries in its region, 
and relative to countries at similar levels of development in other parts of the world, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been notable. An analysis of Tunisia’s path to 
development reveals that the country’s development strategy relied primarily on 
diversifying its production and trade and enhancing its human capital with emphasis on 
women’s empowerment. Family planning programmes that have caused fertility to 
decline significantly are a hallmark of Tunisia’s development strategy. This paper 
reviews Tunisia’s experience, identifies the major challenges and threats to the viability 
of its development strategy, and pinpoints lessons for other countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia were all hailed as IMF success stories in the 1990s,1 but 
only Tunisia continued its path to development at a sustained pace and succeeded in 
achieving remarkable progress in growth (with an average GDP growth rate exceeding 5 
per cent in the 1990s) and human development (health and education), particularly for 
women. Tunisia achieved an international success mainly by enhancing its trade sector 
(exports) both in volume and in terms of its diversification, and achieved domestic 
success to a large extent by raising the level of its human capital (see Figure 1). 
Tunisia’s development strategy involved significant political will, especially one that 
supported national education and women’s rights. The country’s recent performance in 
several social and economic dimensions relative to countries in its region, and relative 
to countries at similar levels of development in other parts of the world, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), has been remarkable.  
In addition, Tunisia managed rather successfully the period of liberalization and reforms 
in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, and did not suffer from the fiscal 
deficits that often result from reducing or eliminating trade restrictions. UNECA (2004: 
15) notes that:  
most of the African countries that made the fastest progress in trade liberalization 
over the last ten years saw a significant decrease in revenues from international 
trade taxes. But in some, such as Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia, this did 
not translate into higher deficits. 
Table 1 displays selected economic and social indicators in 2004 (unless noted 
otherwise) in Tunisia and in different groups of countries. It is shown that income per 
capita in Tunisia is higher than the average for middle-income countries, the MENA 
region, and the average in East Asia and the Pacific. Tunisia’s openness to trade (trade 
as per cent of GDP) is higher than the average in any other region, and its ratio of 
manufacture exports as percent of GDP is 81 per cent, which is about the same as the 
average for the European Monetary Union and is greater than the average for all other 
regions. Tunisia has also shown significant progress in the social dimensions of 
development. The country outperforms the average for almost all other regions of 
developing and emerging countries in measures of life expectancy, age dependency, and 
fertility rates. In fact, fertility rates in 2004 are about one-third lower than the average 
for the MENA region and are less than one half the average rate observed in SSA (2.02 
versus 5.31). 
In summary, on the basis of several socioeconomic indicators Tunisia seems to perform 
better than the average middle-income country. However, in order to better assess 
Tunisia’s accomplishments, we need to examine its progress over the last several years. 
Table A1 shows the composition of GDP in 1980 and 2000, in selected countries. We 
observe that Tunisia has managed to increase its per-capita income (PPP value) 
significantly from US$3,763 to US$5,730, an increase of 53 per cent in the course of 
two decades. Tunisia’s progress in this area far exceeds that of the other two countries 
from the Maghreb region (Algeria and Morocco) but may not be considered impressive 
compared to countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and Mauritius. Income, 
                                                 
1   See Pfeifer (1999) for an interesting discussion of this point. 2 
however, is often an inadequate measure of a successful development strategy. The 
composition of income may tell us more about the directions the country has taken in 
the last two decades and help identify potential spillover effects on social and other 
development dimensions. The numbers displayed in Table A1 indicate that Tunisia had 
reduced the shares of agriculture (by 13 per cent) and industry (by 8 per cent) in its 
GDP, and increased the share of services by 8 per cent from 1980 to 2000. 
Tunisia’s highly praised performance is not limited to economic achievements. Indeed, 
demographic and social indicators have registered important progress. Tunisia has the  
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Age dependency ratio  0.49  0.51  0.46 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.89 0.5  0.49 
Credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
59.04 36.64 105.12 25.59 38.39 35.51 66.28 105.98  65.35 
Electrical power consumption 
(per capita) 2003 
1708  3343 1184 1618  1213 394 513 6761  1118 
Fertility rate, total  2.13  1.94  2.01 2.45 3.04 3.11 5.31 1.5  2.02 
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 
6.3 6.14  8.13 4.49 3.71 6.22 2.86  1.62  5.05 
GDP per capita, PPP  
(const. 2000 international $) 
6176 9610  4923 7324 5334 2651 1803 25840  7163 
Labourforce, female  
(% of total) 
42.05 40.74  43.84 40.24 27.17 29.33 42.19  43.42  27.14 
Life expectancy (yrs)  70.04  69.21  70.28 72.18 69.35 63.41 46.22  79.38 73.3 
Manufacutures exports  
(% of exports) 2003 
64.18 61.23  80.22 56.13 20.39 79.07 31.37  81.76 81.5 
Trade (% of GDP)  66.95  72.39  82.4 48.39 67.29 40.05  63.4 70.91  92.68 
Rural population  46.75  28.23  59.44 23.19 43.22 71.78 65.27 26.68  35.08 
Source:  World Bank (2006). 
Source:  World Bank (2006). 3 
lowest fertility rate (around 1.8 per cent in 2005-07) in the Arab and Muslim world, and 
one of the lowest rates among middle-income countries. Infant mortality rates (per 
1,000 live births) fell from 135 in 1970 to 20 in 2005, while in Algeria and Morocco, 
the rates in 2005 were 34 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively (UNDP 2008). 
Similarly, Tunisia has succeeded in lowering under-5 mortality rates from 201 in 1970 
to 24 in 2005. In Algeria and Morocco these rates fell, respectively, from 220 to 39 and 
from 184 to 39, over the same period. Life expectancy in Tunisia is one of the highest in 
the MENA region and Africa, reaching an average of 73 years over the period 2000-05. 
In addition, women in Tunisia have experienced less gender inequality relative to 
women in other Arab countries, thanks in a large part to family planning programmes 
and pro-women laws that have been enforced throughout the three-decade tenure of 
President Bourguiba, and seem to have continued since the end of his presidency in 
1987.  
The main purpose of this paper is to review Tunisia’s development strategy, outline the 
reasons for its success, and assess the viability of this strategy in the future in the face of 
some major challenges, particularly high unemployment. The paper also tries to 
pinpoint the lessons that can be learned or replicated by other countries. The remainder 
of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Tunisia’s 
development strategy highlighting in particular the role of diversification and human 
development. Section 3 discusses the main reasons for the success of Tunisia’s 
development strategy. Section 4 comments on the challenges that need to be addressed 
in order for Tunisia’s development strategy to continue its success. Section 5 outlines 
the main lessons for other countries. Concluding comments are presented in the final 
section. 
2  Tunisia’s development strategy and how it was pursued 
In general, Tunisia’s development strategy focused on three main areas: 
(i)  diversification of its economy (and exports), (ii) investing in human capital, and   
(iii) empowering women. These three areas are interlinked and have had important 
spillover effects on each other, as well as on other economic and social dimensions of 
the Tunisian society. 
Tunisian timeseries data for the period 1970-2003 indicate that there are significant 
correlations between human development measures, institutional quality, trade 
indicators, and income. The correlation coefficients displayed in Table 2 indicate strong 
(high values and highly significant) positive correlation between income on the one 
hand, and the indicators of human capital (literacy, life expectancy, and the share of 
women in the labourforce), institutional quality (ICRG index), and trade and trade 
diversification (trade, the share of manufactures in exports, and the entropy index)2 on 
                                                 
2  The entropy index (used here as a measure of export diversification) is given by the following 
formula. 
log (1/ ) 1 2
N Entropy P p i ii = ∑ =  
 N  is the total number of export commodities in the export portfolio and Pi represents the actual share 
of the ith commodity in total exports. The maximum value of the entropy index occurs when all the Pi 
are equal. This implies maximum diversification as all commodities in the export portfolio have 
identical share. Thus, higher values of the Entropy index imply higher diversification (Ben 
Hammouda et al. 2006).  
Table 2 
Correlations 
  Income  Entropy  Trade  FDI  Literacy Fertility Credit  Growth ICRG  Manuf-  Female 
                 exports  labour- 
                   force  (share) 
Entropy 0.711   
 0.000   
Trade 0.737  0.484     
 0.000  0.016 
FDI 0.339  -0.129  0.670     
  0.076 0.546 0.000 
Literacy  0.977 0.861 0.894 0.594     
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fertility -0.960  0.892  -0.898 -0.596 -0.996     
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit 0.292  -0.134  0.093 0.518 0.185  -0.201 
  0.131 0.532 0.550 0.000 0.234 0.189 
Growth  0.013 0.069 0.051 0.039 0.043  -0.093 0.044   
  0.947 0.746 0.743 0.797 0.780 0.546 0.773 
ICRG  0.898 0.824 0.693 0.432 0.899  -0.896 0.153 0.098 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.327 0.532 
Manuf-exports 0.938  0.858 0.505 0.309 0.695  -0.682 0.198 0.195 0.691 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.197 0.204 0.000 
Female  labourforce  0.980 0.387 0.946 0.683 0.923  -0.904 0.242    0.090 0.715 0.521 
  0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.560 0.000 0.000 
Life  0.916 0.946 0.949 0.620 0.972  -0.982 0.175 0.098 0.819 0.636 0.947 
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.253 0.524 0.000 0.000    0.000 
Notes:  Most data are for the period 1970-2003. Credit: domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP); FDI: foreign direct investment, net inflows ( per cent of gross capital 
formation); fertility: fertility rate, total (births per woman); literacy: literacy rate, adult total (% of people aged 15 and above) 
  Income (log): log of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 international $); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide, composite risk rating (0=highest risk to 
100=lowest); female labourforce: Labourforce, female (% of total labourforce); life: Life expectancy at birth, total (years); manuf-exports: Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports); trade: Exports plus imports (% of GDP). 




the other. As expected, there is a strong negative association between income and 
fertility rates. Fertility rates also have high correlations (with expected signs) with life 
expectancy, literacy, the share of women in the labourforce, trade and trade 
diversification, and institutional quality.  
Surprisingly, credit to the private sector (the variable credit) does not have any 
significant association except with foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition, growth 
in GDP per capita (growth) does not show any significant correlation with the other 
variables, suggesting that the association between growth and the other variable may be 
better detected over a longer period of time, such as 5-year or 10-year averages; or that 
there is no significant contemporaneous correlation between growth and the other 
variables. 
2.1 Diversification   
2.1.1 Production diversification 
Ghali and Mohnen (2004) identify three phases in Tunisia’s development. The first 
phase started in 1961 and ended in 1970, and was characterized by ‘high growth rates 
driven by substantial public investments in basic infrastructure, human resource 
development, and agricultural expansion’. This phase ended with a ‘macroeconomic 
crisis’ resulting from several factors, including high public debt and current account 
deficits, and poor performance of the agricultural sector due to frequent drought. The 
next phase began in 1971 and ended in 1986 and was characterized by what the authors 
call ‘a mixed economy’, where the private initiative was encouraged and the private 
sector, particularly in manufacturing, began to develop. Export promotion was 
encouraged through tax incentives and tariff exemption for the import of machinery and 
equipments. However, this phase was also characterized by significant government 
control of the economy, including maintaining price and interest rate controls, and a 
preference for expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. As a result, serious 
macroeconomic imbalances developed in the first half of the 1980s and Tunisia agreed 
to an IMF structural adjustment programme in 1986.3 As noted in Ghali and Mohnen, 
structural adjustment efforts characterized the period from 1987 onwards (phase three). 
Phase three witnessed important trade and financial sector liberalization initiatives, the 
accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) membership, and the 
free trade agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1995.  
Tunisia’s success is, to a large extent, due to its ability to achieve good economic 
performance since the mid-1980s. In particular, Tunisia has succeeded in deepening its 
diversification process in a period of structural adjustments. Given that the rapid 
liberalization and reforms that usually accompany such adjustment programmes can 
limit a country’s ability to diversify its economy (see UNECA 2007), Tunisia’s 
deepened economic diversification is a significant achievement.  
The diversification process in Tunisia, as in many other African countries, began shortly 
after its independence from France (in 1956) and picked up pace since the mid-1980s. 
                                                 
3   For more on the reforms in Tunisia and other Maghreb countries, see Jbili, Enders and Treichel 
(1997), Ravallion and Lokshin (2004), World Bank (2004), and Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2006). 6 
In this context, UNECA 2007 Economic Report on Africa (2007: 9).states the 
following: 
Two distinct periods stand out in Africa’s development strategy. The period 
spanning the 1960s and the 1970s was characterized by policies aimed at 
strengthening economic autonomy. It is during this period that diversification 
oriented policies were aggressively pursued in most countries. A major shift in 
economic policies in Africa was occasioned by the economic crises of the early 
1980s. Most of the post independence economic policies geared to long-term 
development were replaced by macroeconomic stabilization policies focusing on 
short-term goals. 
Tunisia has deviated from this general trend since the mid-1980s. Indeed, UNECA 
(2007) places Tunisia among the group of countries that have ‘deepened the 
diversification process’ (see Table A2). However, in relatively small countries 
diversification of the economy may need to translate into diversification of exports in 
order to generate significant gains (through, for example, economies of scale and access 
to more advanced technologies). As shown in Figure 2, there was a significant rise in 
manufacturing exports, and a sharp decline in food and agricultural exports. 
Tunisia faced two major constraints in the early stages of its development strategy. In 
general, in order to develop a significant manufacturing sector, an economy needs well-
developed power sources (energy) and raw materials, and large markets; both of which 
were rather in limited supply in Tunisia. For many years, Tunisia’s manufacturing (and 
exports) focused mainly on textile and leather, and food products. Although, the textile 
and clothing sector remains significant, in the late 1980s and early 1990s Tunisia began 
to significantly enhance the diversification of its production and exports by adding, for 
example, production and export of chemicals and mechanical, electric, and electronic 
equipment. These efforts were supported by significant FDI inflows, which in turn were 
responsive to the new Tunisian investment codes of the 1980s. During the same period 
of time important liberalization and privatization programmes began to be implemented.  
Figure 2 
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Source:     World Bank (2006). 7 
2.1.2  Trade and export diversification 
The trade ratio in Tunisia has been consistently higher than that of other North African 
countries and there was significant growth in exports since the mid-1980s (Table A3). 
Because this can sometimes be explained by the relatively small size of the country—as 
small countries tend to have a higher trade sector—it would be more useful to examine 
the dynamics of Tunisia’s trade sector. As indicated in Table A3, Tunisia’s share of 
manufactures in merchandise exports has significantly increased (from about 36 per 
cent in 1980 to 77 per cent in 2000).4 The share of ores and metal has declined from 3.6 
per cent in 1980 to 1.5 per cent in 2000. The share of import duties in Tunisia’s tax 
revenues fell from about 31 per cent in 1980 to 12.5 per cent in 2000, reflecting an 
overall downward trend in import duties. Since the mid-1980s, Tunisia has been one of 
two countries (Morocco is the other one) in North Africa with the most consistent 
positive average growth rates in merchandise exports (Table 3).  
Tunisia has a relatively well-diversified economy and this diversification is also 
apparent in the composition of its exports in recent years. The entropy index (an 
indicator of diversification) increased by about 60 per cent, from 1.02 in 1980 to 1.62 in 
2003 (Table 4). It is worth noting that the trend in trade (export) volume has closely 
matched the trend in export diversification (Table 4). Figure 3 portrays the behaviour of 
the trade ratio, export ratio, and the diversification indicator (1980-2003). We observe 
that since the mid-1980s these variables seem to have consistent co-movements. 
 
Table 3 
Growth of merchandise exports in North Africa, 1980-2003 (%)  
  1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2001-03 
Algeria -2.2  1.7  -6.3  10.4  2.3 
Egypt 2.7  12.8  -6.4  3.9  5.3 
Morocco  -2.6  14.0 8.7 0.8 9.4 
Tunisia -6.4  16.0  8.4  1.6  11.3 
Source: UNCTAD  (2004). 
Table 4 





(% of GDP) 
Exports 
 (% of GDP) 
1980-84 1.09  83.15  37.17 
1985-89 1.37  76.81  36.70 
1990-94 1.51  89.40  41.75 
1995-99 1.49  89.19  43.23 
2000-03 1.57  94.00  44.98 
Source:   World Bank (2006); Ben Hammouda et al. (2006). 
 
 
                                                 
4   See Fosu (2002) for an insightful discussion of the importance of exporting manufactured goods.  8 
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Tunisia’s experience with diversification is highlighted in the UNECA Economic 
Report (of 2004: 8), which notes the following. 
Over the last two decades Africa has made gradual but insufficient progress in 
export diversification... A few African countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, have 
moved into non-traditional exports, typically, vegetables, fruits, and flowers. Even 
more encouraging are the few countries that have successfully promoted 
manufacturing exports, such as Mauritius and Tunisia. These experiences can 
provide lessons for other African countries. 
2.2 Human  development 
Tunisia tackled two issues better than most Arab and Muslim countries, and began to do 
so shortly after its independence from France. First, to reduce gender inequities it 
instituted laws that were less unfavourable to women, including laws pertaining to 
marriage and divorce, and the right to vote and stand for election. The first woman was 
elected to parliament in 1959 (in Morocco, for example, this did not happen until 
1993!). Second, to improve human development Tunisia placed more emphasis on 
education. Four decades later, Tunisia outperformed all North African countries (see 
Baliamoune-Lutz 2006) and many of the remaining MENA and African countries in 
women’s health, fertility rates (which are now comparable to fertility rates in some 
developed countries), and literacy rates, especially female literacy. Perhaps it is this 
early start in focusing on human development (health and education) and on the 
important role of women in society that provided Tunisia with good initial conditions 
for its successful development strategy. It is worth stressing that Habib Bourguiba, the 
first president of independent Tunisia (ruled from 1957 to 1987 and is viewed by many 
as the father of modern Tunisia) was quite supportive of women’s rights. Bourguiba 
Source:   Data on the index of entropy are from Ben Hammouda et al. (2006). Data on the export 
ratio and openness index from World Bank (2006). 9 
made polygamy illegal and raised the minimum age at which girls can get married to 17 
years of age. Thus, a significant political will was behind the policies of family 
planning, generalized access to education, and women’s rights in Tunisia. Bourguiba’s 
policies had a significant impact on the behaviour of fertility rates and women’s 
education and participation in the labourforce. 
Tunisia had much more success than other Maghreb countries in reducing poverty rates 
in both urban and rural areas. As Table 4 shows, although Tunisia had higher poverty 
rates than Algeria in the 1980s, it achieved significantly lower rates in the mid-1990s. In 
1992, Tunisia created a programme known as the National Solidarity Fund with the aim 
to use it as a vehicle through which private and public donations are channelled to 
development projects. This was one of the initiatives (several others were created since 
then) of the 1990s aimed at reducing the adverse effects of liberalization and reform 
programmes. 
Table 4 
Rural and urban poverty 
 1984-85      1998-99 
  Urban Rural    Urban Rural 
Morocco 17.3  32.6    12.0  27.2 






b  14.7  30.3 
Notes 
a 1995;  
b1988. 
Source:  Adapted from Baliamoune-Lutz (2006).  
2.2.1 Education  
In Tunisia, schooling is obligatory between the age of 6 and 16, and is free to all school-
aged children. Tunisia has always viewed public education as a national priority. It 
seems that this strategy is currently paying off and contributing significantly to 
Tunisia’s development (see discussion in the next section). During the last 15 years, 
Tunisia more than doubled the ratio of its spending on public education, increasing it 
from 6 per cent of its GDP (7.3 per cent of total government expenditure) in 1991 to 
14.2 per cent of its GDP (20.8 per cent of total government expenditure) in 2002-05. 
Moreover, an important reform took place in July 1989 when the government 
introduced free obligatory education until the age of 16 and increased the basic 
education cycle to nine years. These reforms were accompanied by several actions to 
enhance teacher quality such as hiring more teachers with higher degrees and enhancing 
school computerization. Ghali and Mohnen (2004: 2) note that ‘with these measures, 
dropout rates have decreased steadily. Achievements in education have not only helped 
reduce poverty, but have also created an increasingly educated and productive 
workforce’.  
Adult literacy rates increased from 27.4 per cent in 1970 to over 73 per cent in 2002, 
and youth literacy rates increased from 52 per cent to over 94 per cent over the same 
period. More impressive is the change in female literacy. In 1970, female literacy was 
about 15 per cent while male literacy was 41 per cent. In 2002, these rates were about 
63 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively. The gap in youth literacy in 2002 is much 
smaller (female and male literacy rates are 91 per cent and 98 per cent, respectively). 
Similarly, secondary school enrolment (per cent gross) increased from about 23 per cent 
in 1970 to 78 per cent in 2002. Since the late 1990s female secondary school enrolments 10 
have been greater than male enrolment rates (in 2002, they were 80 per cent and 77 per 
cent, respectively). In 2002, enrolments in higher education (tertiary) were about 23 per 
cent (25 per cent for women and 20 per cent for men), which is quite high relative to 
Tunisia’s region. In 2005, tertiary enrolments rate for Tunisian women was 35 per cent 
(40 per cent higher than that of their male counterparts), which is higher than the rates 
registered in Hong Kong or Mexico, for example. In contrast, Morocco’s female tertiary 
enrolment rate was 10 per cent (about 15 per cent lower than the rate for men) (UNDP 
2006). 
2.2.2 Fertility and other health indicators 
Tunisians have a relatively high life expectancy. In 2005, life expectancy in Tunisia was 
73.5, which is six years higher than the average for Arab states, and higher than the 
average in Latin America, middle-income countries, and East-Asia and the Pacific. 
Mortality rates in Tunisia are among the lowest in the region. In addition, Tunisia has 
one of the lowest under-five mortality rates in Africa and the Arab region. Under-five 
mortality rates (per 1,000) in Tunisia fell from 254 in 1960 to 26 in 2002, while 
Morocco, for example, had less success; reducing the rate from 211 to 43, over the same 
period of time.  
Tunisia’s success in controlling population growth has been quite remarkable. Bechri 
and Naccache (2003: 17) maintain that ‘population control allowed Tunisia to enter a 
“virtuous circle” with population control enhancing socio-economic development, and 
socio-economic development, in turn, enhancing population control. This “Tunisian 
exception” will later on explain the country’s status as a top performer in terms of GDP 
per capita growth, in the region’. 
The topic of family planning and fertility rates in Tunisia has been extensively studied 
since the 1960s due, to a large extent, to the country’s good quality statistics on fertility 
and family planning. Povey and Brown (1968: 620) report the following. 
Since independence in 1956, a number of legislative steps have been taken which 
tend to decrease population growth. Women were emancipated and given the 
vote. The minimum legal age of marriage was made 17 for women and 20 for 
men. Other actions deliberately reversed the pro-natalist policy established by the 
French. The law prohibiting the importation and sale of contraceptives was 
revoked. Welfare support was limited to the first four children. In 1965, abortion 
was made legal for women with five or more living children. Discussions between 
the Government of Tunisia and the Ford Foundation on family planning began in 
1962… Tunisia thus became the first country on the continent of Africa to 
institute a national family planning programme. 
Similarly, Lapham (1970) states that one third of the decline in birth rates in Tunisia in 
1967 and 1968 could be attributed to the national family planning programme. Rising 
the minimum legal age and empowering women in Tunisia seem to have contributed to 
what Fargues (1989) calls ‘marriage transition’.5 The author argues that this transition is 
associated with two important changes: an educational transition (women’s education 
increases), and increased female participation in the labourforce. Both of these changes 
                                                 
5   See Chamari (1991) for a discussion (in French) of the effects of the legal aspects of women’s status 
in Tunisia and their contribution to the country’s development strategy. 11 
have taken place in Tunisia. Indeed, Fargues (1989) notes that ‘Tunisia is a striking 
example of what can be termed a real “educational transition” ’. 
2.3  Linkages between trade, human capital, and income  
Ghali and Mohnen (2004: 2) contend that:  
while growth and poverty reduction in Tunisia were driven largely by the 
economic reforms of the late 1980s, they were augmented and reinforced by the 
pursuit of economic and social policies that focused on improving individual and 
collective welfare, especially in education, health, and social assistance. 
Indeed, it seems that Tunisia’s social policy played an important role in the success of 
its economic reform by enabling the diversification of its economy and exports, 
upgrading of the labourforce quality and enhancing human capital (education, health, 
and female participation), and facilitating collective action. Human capital in particular 
contributed significantly to strengthening the set of initial conditions for the 
implementation of Tunisia’s development strategy and the success of the manufacturing 
sector and the diversification process. Another contributor to the good initial conditions 
is the country’s geographical location. Tunisia is in the southern Mediterranean region, 
with a climate that is generally favourable to tourism and agriculture. Its proximity to 
Europe has been an important trade (and FDI) enabler with the EU countries, Italy and 
France, in particular. In 2005, the share of exports to these two countries was about 60 
per cent of Tunisia’s total exports.  
Ghali and Mohnen (2004) note that Tunisia’s successful experience can be attributed to 
(i) successful implementation of economic reform and stabilization programmes (since 
the mid 1980s); (ii) the focus on social policy (education, social security, health, and 
helping the poor); (iii) the decline in population growth; and (iv) continuing investment 
in basic infrastructure. The spillover effects and the linkages between human capital, 
social policy, and economic policy seem indeed to be crucial to the success of Tunisia’s 
development experience. 
In a recent study, Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) examines long-run relationships and short-
run dynamics in the relationship between variables related to trade, income, and human 
development in Tunisia and finds that income per capita, diversification indicators, the 
share of women in the labourforce, adult literacy, and fertility rates are cointegrated, 
suggesting stable long-run relationships among these variables. The same study tests for 
pairwise Granger causality6 between several variables but does not find evidence of 
pairwise Granger causality between income, trade openness, and the share of 
manufactures in exports. On the other hand, the author finds that the indicator of 
diversification (entropy index) Granger causes openness to trade and FDI. These results 
seem to be consistent with Tunisia’s story of the important impact of diversification. In 
addition, Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) finds that the share of women in the labourforce 
Granger causes income, openness to trade, and manufacturing exports; female literacy 
causes the share of women in the labourforce; while fertility rates cause openness to 
trade and the female labourforce. 
                                                 
6   Granger causality tests allow us to investigate whether past values of a variable can be useful for 
anticipating the future behaviour of another variable. 12 
3  Reasons for the success of Tunisia’s development strategy 
3.1  Political economy: Reforms and interest groups7 
In the mid-1950s there were several major (organized) interest groups in Tunisia, 
including the ruling party (Neo-Destour) elite, producers’ associations and labour 
unions. From the start, the Bourguiba regime used neutralization and co-optation of 
major interest groups, which helped avoid confrontation and facilitate coordination. As 
pointed out by Bechri and Naccache (2003), the leadership of producers’ association 
was neutralized, and the only interest groups that could significantly influence 
government policy were the ruling party elite and the national labour union UGTT, 
which had infiltrated (co-optation) the Neo-Destour party. The authors also point out 
that Tunisia ended up implementing the UGTT policies. This was an important factor in 
reducing (or eliminating) conflict. 
The secular and modernist leadership in independent Tunisia gave the country an early 
start on some important reforms. Social modernization played a crucial role in Tunisia’s 
development. In the late 1950s, Tunisia implemented the most progressive reforms of 
female status and women’s rights in the Arab and Islamic world (perhaps with the 
exception of Turkey) and began focusing on female education, reproductive health, and 
population control. In the early 1960s, Tunisia created a family planning agency (Office 
National de Planning Familial) and limited social security benefits to a maximum of 
three children per family, which eliminated an important incentive to have a large 
family. These policies faced sharp criticism from most countries in the Islamic and Arab 
world. The policies of neutralization and co-optation of other interest groups allowed 
the leadership of the ruling party to implement these social policies early on and without 
major internal political or social confrontation. 
On the other hand, economic policy has vacillated between several tendencies, 
including socialism and central planning in the 1960s, a two-track economic system in 
the 1970s, and economic populism during the first half of the 1980s. In 1972 (under the 
two-track strategy), Tunisia adopted the off-shore companies law, which granted export 
firms duty-free import of equipment and other inputs, and significant tax exemptions. 
The government also enhanced credit for small and medium enterprises, and created a 
government agency for promoting industry and a centre for export promotion in order to 
help exporters access foreign markets. The two-track strategy pursued in the 1970s 
seems to be relevant to policy developments of the late 1980s and 1990s. Bechri and 
Naccache (2003: 24) note the following. 
Export-oriented industries are a priori in a good position to influence policy since 
they help achieve an important government objective. A particular success in this 
respect was scored by the ‘mechanicals and electricals’ sector. This activity 
started as an import-substitution aimed at absorbing local demand. But, the 
establishment of foreign companies including some multinationals’ subsidiaries 
demonstrated to Tunisian business the existence of opportunities in exports for 
                                                 
7   Bechri and Naccache (2003) argue that the theory of collective action cannot explain why 
inefficiencies prevail and does not explain the timing of reforms or why a severe crisis leads to 
reforms in some countries but not in others. In the case of Tunisia, the authors focus on three 
institutional dimensions: representation, coordination, and commitment. 13 
products like autoparts, cables, and batteries. As a result, the sector shifted 
gradually from import substitution to exportables.  
The most significant economic reforms occurred in the latter part of the 1980s. Tunisia 
experienced a severe balance-of-payment crisis in 1986 and had to adopt an IMF 
structural adjustment and stabilization programme, including strong devaluation of the 
Tunisian dinar and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. A change in the political 
leadership took place three months after Tunisia started the structural adjustment 
programme but the politics of co-optation have continued, which again helped to avoid 
confrontation and facilitate coordination. 
An important contributing factor to the success of the economic reforms and export 
orientation is the ‘cooperation’ of important interest groups. This seems to be reflected 
in the role played by exporters, especially in the textiles and clothing, and mechanical 
and electrical sectors. Indeed, Bechri and Naccache (2003) argue that ‘the three decades 
old export-oriented strategy in Tunisia ended up creating a new constituency, which has 
a stake in export’. This also helped support Tunisia’s signing of the free trade agreement 
with the EU. 
3.2 Political  stability 
Since independence Tunisia has not, in general, experienced any significant political 
instability. In November 1987, a ‘peaceful’ coup was staged against Bourguiba who was 
declared to be unfit for the presidency and the newly-appointed prime minister, Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali, became president and was re-elected for successive terms since 
November 1987. In addition, Tunisia’s military spending as a percentage of its 
government budget is much smaller than the world average (and the average for the 
MENA region) and seems to indicate a smaller role of the military in Tunisia relative to 
the military sector in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, for example.  
The impact of political stability on exports has been documented by Fosu (2003). The 
author studies the effect of political instability on export performance in 30 African 
countries and shows that this effect is negative. Thus, the Tunisian case confirms Fosu’s 
finding. More recently, Tunisia’s success has also been helped by improved institutional 
quality (UNECA 2007). Several empirical studies (for example, Dollar and Kraay 2003; 
Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz 2006) show that institutions can have a significant effect 
on economic policy reforms. 
4  Does Tunisia’s development strategy remain viable for the future? 
Tunisia currently faces several challenges that may threaten the viability of its 
development strategy in the future. First, unemployment, particularly among educated 
Tunisians remains high (around 15 per cent on average in recent years). In 2003, the 
official unemployment rate was 14.3 per cent, and 47 per cent of the unemployed had 
completed secondary (37.4 per cent) or tertiary (10 per cent) education.8 Tunisia’s 1995 
                                                 
8  See Ghali and Mohnen (2004) for a discussion of the factors that may have contributed to high 
unemployment rates in Tunisia. 14 
agreement with the EU will create a free trade zone between EU countries and Tunisia 
in 2010, and this may exacerbate the unemployment situation.  
Second, there is still high regional inequality, particularly between rural and urban 
areas. Poverty is much higher in rural areas (King 1999). Thus, Tunisia may need to 
significantly increase spending on social programmes, health, and education in order to 
reduce poverty in rural areas. While this may be costly, the alternative (status quo) 
could have even more disastrous consequences. Tunisia already has the highest ratio of 
urban population among the four largest North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, and 
Morocco being the other three) with more than two-thirds of its population living in 
urban areas (in 2005). A continuous high influx from rural areas may increase the 
fragility of the infrastructure and social structure of the cities.  
Third, Tunisia’s financial sector has been liberalized, as part of the liberalization and 
reform programmes of the late 1980s and early 1990s but it has failed to mobilize 
significant domestic savings. State-owned (public) banks dominate in terms of size 
(around 50 per cent of the banking sector assets) and tend to have high inefficiency 
(Cook, Hababou and Liang 2005). Credit to the private sector is not high enough, so that 
small and medium private businesses often are unable to have access to bank loans. 
Having access to credit is especially important in the context of production and export 
diversification.  
Finally, the current president (Ben Ali) is 72 years old and, according to Tunisia’s 
constitution, he cannot run for another term once he reaches 75, which implies that he 
will still be able to run for a fifth term in 2009. The country has had only two presidents 
since independence over half a century ago. This raises the question of whether Tunisia 
would be able to continue the kind of political stability that had an important impact on 
its development strategy after Ben Ali’s departure. 
5  Lessons for other countries 
There are at least three lessons to be learned from the Tunisian experience. The first 
lesson and perhaps easiest to replicate is Tunisia’s success in reducing fertility rates and 
enforcing family planning, which is particularly relevant for countries that have high 
population growth such as Arab and African countries. Lower fertility rates alone will 
not necessarily lead to higher growth and development. As argued in this paper, Tunisia 
invested significantly in education and health. This in turn, enhanced productivity and 
female participation in the labourforce, resulting in better and greater human capital. 
The development effects from reduced fertility can be quite significant. Yet, political 
factors and the associated institutional arrangements can be crucial to the behaviour and 
effects of fertility. Indeed, Feng, Kugler and Zak (2000) show that political factors have 
a significant effect on fertility decisions and that ‘a one-time disturbance compounds 
across generations, impacting a country's entire development trajectory’.  
The second lesson is that social policy reforms can significantly aid economic reforms. 
As noted earlier, Tunisia’s social policy was quite progressive and contributed 
significantly to enhancing initial conditions, particularly with regard to the welfare and 
role of women. 15 
The third lesson concerns the role of political stability. It is important to note that 
Tunisia is not very strong in terms of democratic institutions (political institutional 
quality) but has, in general, been politically stable. To some extent (in addition to the 
politics of co-optation and neutralization of major interest groups) this stability 
enhanced the perception of government credibility and commitment and facilitated 
coordination, which in turn helped put in place the necessary reforms with generally 
little confrontation. 
Thus, Tunisia’s path to development may provide useful lessons to replicate in other 
regions, as long as countries have macroeconomic and political stability, relatively good 
governance, and the political will to reduce inequality and enhance human capital. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
The review and analysis of Tunisia’s experience suggest that Tunisia’s development 
strategy has relied primarily on diversifying its production, expanding the trade sector 
(both in terms of the size of its share and in terms of trade diversification), and human 
development—with a special emphasis on gender equality.9 Overall, the country has 
managed to achieve a relatively harmonious marriage between economic (growth and 
income) and other important dimensions of social and human development. The success 
of Tunisia’s ‘early bird’ strategy of focusing on diversification10 was aided by several 
factors including the country’s proximity to European markets and trade agreements 
with the EU,11 skilled labourforce, the quality and size of its female labourforce, and 
political and macroeconomic stability. In addition, this paper highlights the limits of 
Tunisia’s development strategy in view of some challenges that the country currently 
faces, especially high unemployment rates, and outlines major lessons for other 
countries. 
According to Bechri and Naccache (2003), ‘the Tunisian experience proved also how 
crucial social modernization could be in isolating traditional groups and in rallying the 
support of women, trade unions and the liberal fringes of the population, as well as in 
improving the standard of living’. Thus, in this paper we also discuss the role of interest 
groups and political economy in shaping development policy in Tunisia.  
 
                                                 
9  See Baliamoune-Lutz (2007) for a study of the linkages between trade, female labourforce and 
gender inequality in Africa. 
10  Tunisia also has an important tourism sector. Poirier and Wright (1993) point out that ‘resort tourism 
has been perceived by policymakers as one of the best ways to improve the country’s infrastructure 
while simultaneously becoming since 1974 the second largest earner of foreign exchange’. In 2006, 
Tunisia was one of the top African countries (ranked fourth) in tourism receipts which totaled 
US$1.9 billion (UNECA 2007). 
11  In 1996, the EU began funding a technological upgrading programme (Programme de Mise à Niveau) 
of Tunisian firms as part of its agreement of cooperation with the country. It is worth noting that in a 
recent study, Ben Hammouda, Chemingui and Bchir (2007) find that the Euro-Med agreement did not 
have a significant impact on the structure of Tunisia’s imports of manufactures.  16 
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GDP composition in selected countries (1970 and 2000) 
 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(constant 1995 





% share of: 
Manufacturing Services Agriculture
     1980       
Algeria 5,089.70  0.79  57.65 10.55  33.84  8.51 
Argentina 10,774.00  4.15  41.22 29.48  52.43  6.35 
Botswana 2,652.70  11.99  43.89 4.40  43.41 12.70 
Brazil 6,258.60  9.11  43.83 33.49  45.16  11.01 
Chile 4,253.60  8.15  37.44 21.52  55.30  7.25 
Egypt 2,108.50  10.01  36.78 12.25  44.96  18.26 
Ireland 9,356.10  3.08  35.94 na  52.27  11.79 
Korea, Rep.  4,197.50  -2.09  39.89 28.16  45.27  14.84 
Malaysia 3,730.30  7.44  41.04 21.55  36.35  22.61 
Mauritius 3,764.00  na  26.32 15.71  57.22  16.47 
Morocco 2,588.60  3.64  30.94 16.83  50.63  18.43 
South Africa  10,415.00  9.19 48.21  21.56  45.61  6.18 
Thailand 2,290.50  5.17  28.68 21.51  48.08  23.24 
Tunisia 3,763.50  7.42  31.11 11.79  54.76 14.13 
Turkey 3,656.70  -2.45  22.17 14.32  51.42  26.41 
           
     2000       
Algeria 4,979.30  2.40  59.74 7.75  31.49  8.77 
Argentina 11,131.00  -0.79  27.61 17.52  67.42  4.97 
Botswana 6,910.70  7.55  46.24 4.72  51.16 2.60 
Brazil 6,780.70  4.40  27.88 17.12  64.89  7.22 
Chile 8,411.80  4.40  34.66 16.34  56.81  8.54 
Egypt 3,253.40  5.11  33.06 19.35  50.24  16.70 
Ireland 27,612.00  9.95  42.72 33.44  53.51  3.77 
Korea, Rep.  13,958.00  9.33 42.39  31.28  52.92  4.70 
Malaysia 8,216.80  8.50  50.82 32.66  40.54  8.65 
Mauritius 8,857.70  4.00  31.60 23.98  62.54  5.86 
Morocco 3,195.30  0.96  31.93 17.57  54.24  13.83 
South Africa  8,667.10  3.50  31.14 18.58  65.64  3.22 
Thailand 5,846.10  4.76  41.97 33.58  49.01  9.02 
Tunisia 5,754.20  4.67 28.56 18.17 59.08 12.36 
Turkey 5,730.50  7.36  25.29 15.65  59.35  15.36 





Diversification regimes* and TFP contribution to growth 
Countries   Growth in GDP 
Contribution 
 of labour 
Contribution 
 of capital 
Contribution 
 of TFP 
  Regime 2: Early diversification but no major breakthrough   
Kenya        
1981-85 2.53  2.31  0.86  -0.64 
1986-90 5.64  2.1 1.07 2.47 
1991-95 1.61  2.14  0.86  -1.39 
1996-2000 1.79  1.9  1.01  -1.11 
    
Senegal        
1981-85 3.23  1.56  -0.01 1.68 
1986-90 3.22  1.56  0.28 1.37 
1991-95 1.53  1.55  0.71  -0.74 
1996-2000 5.3  1.5  1.59  2.21 
    
Zimbabwe        
1981-85 4.36  2.55  -0.07 1.88 
1986-90 4.6  2.34  0.67 1.59 
1991-95 1.39  1.33  1.79  -1.73 
    
  Regime 3: Deepened diversification process   
Mauritius        
1981-85 4.33  1.51  1.09 1.73 
1986-90 7.39  1.31  2.66 3.42 
1991-95 5.13  1.08  3.05 0.99 
    
South Africa       
1981-85 0.91  1.74  1.42  -2.25 
1986-90 1.81  1.62  0.3  -0.11 
1991-95 0.89  1.44  0.18  -0.73 
    
Tunisia    
1981-90 3.72  1.28  2.48  -0.04 
1991-97 4.3  1.36  2.12 0.82 
Note:  * UNECA (2007) identifies five different diversification regimes and associates a regime to each 
country. Regimes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer, respectively, to little economic diversification; early 
diversification but no major breakthrough, deepened diversification process, backsliders in the 
diversification process, and conflict and post-conflict countries. 








Trade and taxes on trade 
 
Trade 
(% of GDP) 
Manufactures 
export 




(% of current 
revenue) 
Import duties (% 
of tax revenue)   (% of exports) 
     1980    
Algeria 64.68  0.32  0.46  na  na 
Argentina 11.55  23.15 2.17 0.00  0.00 
Botswana 119.48  na  na  39.11  53.12 
Brazil 20.36  37.21  9.41 7.14  9.09 
Chile 49.80  9.09  64.08  4.34  5.42 
Egypt 73.38  10.95  2.47 17.28  26.40 
Ireland 106.48  54.07  2.68 9.25  10.40 
Korea, Rep.  73.32  89.55 1.13  15.05  17.19 
Malaysia 110.96  18.75  10.19 33.03  16.52 
Mauritius 104.40  27.36  0.01 51.62  39.99 
Morocco 45.27  23.51  40.54  20.78  21.98 
South Africa  62.21  18.20 6.96  3.29  3.45 
Thailand 54.48  25.19 13.60  26.15  21.75 
Tunisia 85.84  35.72 3.62 24.66 31.14 
Turkey 17.09  26.88  7.03 5.96  6.80 
          
     2000    
Algeria 63.77  2.31  0.25 18.47  9.25 
Argentina 22.41  32.25 3.30 5.22  5.17 
Botswana 98.76  89.56 6.97  15.47  37.72  * 
Brazil 22.84  58.52  9.81  na  Na 
Chile 58.51  16.24  45.35  9.34  Na 
Egypt 39.18  38.43  3.87 10.37  17.06  * 
Ireland 182.43  86.28  0.36 0.00  0.00  * 
Korea, Rep.  86.53  90.75 1.26  6.54  7.45  * 
Malaysia 229.28  80.43 1.04 12.29  12.72  *) 
Mauritius 128.62  80.79  0.23 34.58  31.55 
Morocco 68.97  64.09  8.75  15.18  18.02  * 
South Africa  54.44  54.31 10.85 4.12  3.04 
Thailand 124.91  75.56 1.30 16.45  12.20 
Tunisia 91.84  77.00 1.54 27.88 12.50 
Turkey 55.58  81.24  2.57 3.72  1.70 
Note:   * = 1995. 
Source:   World Bank (2006). 